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Abstract
The regulation of vertical relationships between rms is the subject of persistent legal and aca-
demic controversy. The literature studying vertical trade relationships seems to assume that an
upstream monopolist prefers downstream competition over exclusive distribution arrangements.
We derive precise conditions for when an upstream monopolist prefers competing distribution
systems over exclusive distribution in the downstream market. We also show that the welfare
effects of downstream competition are ambiguous. A downstream oligopoly may have negative
welfare properties compared to a downstream monopoly.
JEL Classication: D43; L13; L40
Keywords: Exclusive distribution; Competing distribution; Vertical foreclosure; Cournot
competition
1 Introduction
The regulation of vertical relationships between rms is a highly controversial issue for inter-
national economists and antitrust authorities (GANSLANDT AND MASKUS, 2007; MASKUS
AND CHEN, 2004; RICHARDSON, 2004). At the heart of this debate is the ambiguous na-
ture of the effects of exclusive distribution arrangements on upstream producers, downstream
traders, and consumers. For instance, Apple's shift from exclusive arrangements with national
carriers for the initial distribution of the iPhone (e.g., AT&T in the United States and T-Mobile
1 Contact Author: Frank Mueller-Langer, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition
Law, Marstallplatz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany; frank.mueller-langer@ip.mpg.de. Phone: +49 89 242 46 453,
Fax: +49 89 242 46 503.
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in Germany) to competing distribution systems in 2010 has recently attracted widespread atten-
tion (DE FONTENAY ET AL., 2010; EHRLICH ET AL., 2010).2 In addition, car manufacturers
often maintain exclusive distribution channels in each country in order to vertically control the
operations of their local distributors (LUTZ, 2004).
One puzzle in the literature on vertically organized markets is the challenge to explain the wide-
spread use of exclusive contracts in downstream markets despite the obvious disadvantages of
double marginalization. For an upstream monopolist, exclusive contracts are favorable if the
monopoly rents of the downstream monopolist can be extracted, e.g., by auctioning off the
rights to exclusive dealings. Vertical restraints, however, such as non-linear (two-part) tariffs,
resale price maintenance, or tie-in provisions are often illegal because they either restrict com-
petition or constitute an abuse of dominant position, e.g., according to Sections 1 and 2 of the
U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act or Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union, respectively. If the complete extraction of monopoly rents is impossible, perfect
downstream competition appears to be the best alternative because downstream sellers would
charge prices at the marginal costs determined by the upstream monopolist's prices.
Most of the literature regarding vertical market integration seems to (implicitly) assume that
an upstream monopolist prefers downstream competition over exclusive distribution under lin-
ear pricing (DURHAM, 2000; POLASKY, 1992; REY AND STIGLITZ, 1995). In addition,
oligopolistic upstream rms opt for competition between their divisions in the downstream
market (BAYE ET AL., 1996). Similarly, in modeling oligopolistic intrabrand and interbrand
competition with two upstream rms and two-part tariffs consisting of a xed fee and a per-unit
payment (royalty), SAGGI AND VETTAS (2002, P. 198) suggest:
"In the case of royalty-only contracts, each upstream rm prefers to increase its number
of downstream rms, as long as the rival number of rms are not too large."
We will show that this assertion is correct if the cost difference between the downstream rms
is not too large. However, we will also derive precise conditions under which this assertion
2 The iPhone is now distributed by two exclusive retailers in the U.S., namely, AT&T and Verizon, and three
exclusive retailers in Germany, namely, T-Mobile, Vodafone, and O2.
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does not generally hold. REY AND VERGÉ (2008), in a recent overview of the literature on the
economics of vertical restraints, state on page 361:
"Notice that vertical restraints are not necessarily needed to solve the double-marginalization
problem. Introducing strong intra-brand competition (using several perfectly substitutable
retailers) would remove the retail markup. The manufacturer could then set the wholesale
price equal to (...) the monopoly price (...)."
To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal paper that explicitly investigates this intuition.
We derive precise conditions for when a downstream oligopoly of traders yields higher prots
for the upstream producer than a downstream monopoly. We show that the welfare effects of
downstream competition are ambiguous. A downstream oligopoly may have negative welfare
properties compared to a downstream monopoly.
2 A simple model
There is a single Producer P of a product x with a linear cost function c(x) = c  x. Demand
for the product is given by P (x) = a  bx. The producer cannot access the market directly but
sells the product through either
F Exclusive distribution: a single trader, Trader B; or
F Competing distribution: a (nite) set of competing traders J = f1; 2; :::; ng.
To provide a real-world example, let the producer be an upstream gasoline rener that inu-
ences the retail prices of vertically integrated gasoline stations through station-specic whole-
sale prices (HASTINGS AND GILBERT, 2005). Traders (gasoline stations) j 2 J may differ in
their constant marginal cost of delivery kj . Without loss of generality, the traders are ranked by:
k1  k2  :::kj  kj+1  :::  kn: As the producer's supply prices cannot be lower than the
marginal cost of production c; a trader with local costs kj  a  c would not supply.
Assumption 2.1
(a) increasing local costs: k1  k2  :::kj  kj+1  :::  kn;
(b) potential traders: a  c  kn > 0:
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Assumption 2.1 implies that all traders provide some potential for the producer to earn prots.
3 Exclusive distribution: double marginalization
Trader B has a viable downstream monopoly, a > c + kB. Given the price charged by the
producer q, Trader B chooses x to maximize B = P (x)  x  (q + kB)  x. We obtain
F xB(q) := max

0; 1
2b
(a  q   kB)
	
;
F pB (q) :=
1
2
(a+ q + kB) ;
F B(q) :=
1
4b
(a  q   kB)
2
:
The producer sets q to maximize  = (q   c)  xB(q); yielding the optimal strategy
qM :=
a+ c  kB
2
:
Summarizing, if the downstream monopoly is viable, a > c+ kB, then qM > c and we obtain
F supply price: qM = 1
2
(a+ c  kB) ;
F quantity supplied: xM := xB(qM) = 14b (a  c  kB) ;
F price: pM := pB(qM) = 14 (3a+ c+ kB) ;
F Trader B's prot: MB := B(q
M) = 1
16b
(a  c  kB)
2
;
F producer's prot: M := (qM) = 1
8b
(a  c  kB)
2
;
F consumer surplus: SM := S(qM) = 1
2

a  pM

 xM = 1
32b
(a  c  kB)
2
;
F aggregate prot: M := M + MB =
3
16b
(a  c  kB)
2
;
F welfare: WM := M + SM = 7
32b
(a  c  kB)
2
:
4 Downstream Cournot competition
Before turning to the case of an arbitrary number of potential traders, consider the duopoly case.
4.1 The two-trader case
Consider two potential traders, B and C, with kB  kC . For instance, downstream traders may
differ in per unit costs, due to different levels of customer service (SPIEGEL AND YEHEZKEL,
2003).3 Figure 1 illustrates this situation.
Each trader j 2 fB; Cg chooses xj to maximize j = P (xj+x j)xj (qj + kj)xj . Trader j's
best response is given by rj(x j) = max
n
0;
a bx j qj kj
2b
o
. The Nash equilibrium quantities
3 In contrast to our model, SPIEGEL AND YEHEZKEL (2003) consider consumers who are heterogeneous in
terms of willingness to pay for customer services. They nd that a single upstream producer may foreclose the
(low-cost) retailer who provides low-level customer services to protect the high-quality retailer from competitive
pressure.
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Figure 1. Traders and market
xB(qB; qC) and xC(qB; qC) which depend on the supply price policy of the producer are
xB(qB; qC) = min

max

0;
a+ (qC + kC)  2 (qB + kB)
3b

;max

0;
a  (qB + kB)
2b

;
xC(qB; qC) = min

max

0;
a+ (qB + kB)  2 (qC + kC)
3b

;max

0;
a  (qC + kC)
2b

:
Notice that the producer's supply price policy could be such that only one trader serves the mar-
ket. Hence, exclusive trading can be induced by the producer via price differentiation between
the traders. Figure 2 illustrates two cases. The producer sets prices (qB; qC) to maximize prot
 = (qB   c)  xB(qB; qC) + (qC   c)  xC(qB; qC): (1)
Figure 2. Types of downstream Nash equilibria
The Nash equilibrium quantities xB(qB; qC) and xC(qB; qC) are neither concave nor convex func-
tions. This property complicates the solution of the producer's problem considerably. The Nash
equilibrium quantities are, however, piecewise linear functions of (qB; qC). Moreover, for any
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j = B; C, one can easily conrm that xj(qB; qC) = xj(qj) if and only if x j(qB; qC) = 0. Indeed,
this nding is obvious from Figure 2. Hence, one can divide the set of supply prices (qB; qC)
into four regions, which are depicted in Figure 3:
(i) xB(qB; qC)  xB(qB) and xC(qB; qC)  xC(qC);
(ii) xB(qB; qC) = xB(qB) and xC(qB; qC) = 0;
(iii) xB(qB; qC) = 0 and xC(qB; qC) = xC(qC);
(iv) xB(qB; qC) = 0 and xC(qB; qC) = 0:
Figure 3 shows the iso-prot lines for the prot function of the producer (Equation 1).
Figure 3. Iso-prot lines of the producer
The blue line satises xB(qB; qC) = xB(qB), and the red line satises xC(qB; qC) = xC(qC). The
prot function (Equation 1) is concave within each region. In Region (ii) [(iii)] Trader B [C]
holds exclusive rights.4 The optimal solution for case (i) can be derived from
max
qB;qC
 =
1
3b
f(qB   c)  [a+ (qC + kC)  2 (qB + kB)]
+ (qC   c)  [a+ (qB + kB)  2 (qC + kC)]g :
Straightforward computations yield the solution, which is summarized in Lemma 4.1:
4 In Region (iv), no trader supplies the commodity.
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Lemma 4.1 Suppose there is an equilibrium in which the optimal supply price policy
 
qDB ; q
D
C

is such that both traders supply the commodity. The following solution holds:
F traders' supply prices: qDB =
1
2
(a+ c  kB) ; q
D
C =
1
2
(a+ c  kC) ;
F downstream quantities: xDB = maxf0;
1
6b
(a  c  2kB + kC)g;
xDC = maxf0;
1
6b
(a  c+ kB   2kC)g;
F aggregate supply: xD := xDB + x
D
C =
1
6b
(2 (a  c)  kB   kC) ;
F downstream price: pD = 1
6
(4a+ 2c+ kB + kC) ;
F traders' prot: DB =
1
36b
[(a  c  kB)  (kB   kC)]
2
;
DC =
1
36b
[(a  c  kC) + (kB   kC)]
2
;
F producer's prot: D = 1
12b

(a  c  kB)
2 + (a  c  kC)
2 + (kB   kC)
2
:
Proofs are provided in the appendix. However, straightforward proofs are omitted. Comparing
the prots obtained from exclusive contracts reveals that an exclusive contract with the low-cost
Trader B is more protable for the producer than one with Trader C: The producer chooses a
supply price policy that
F either makes it unprotable for the high-cost trader to participate in the downstream market
(an exclusive contract with B),
F or that has both players supply the commodity (non-exclusive trade).
In Figure 3, the producer chooses supply prices in Regions (i) or (ii) but never in Region (iii).
The following proposition characterizes these cases.
Proposition 4.2 Non-exclusive trade condition
An equilibrium with non-exclusive downstream trade is optimal for the producer if
(a  c  kC) > (kC   kB) : (2)
Proposition 4.2 shows that the producer chooses non-excluding supply prices if the costs of the
high-cost Trader C do not exceed the costs of Trader B by an excessive amount. For kC > kB,
the producer subsidizes C to keep him in the market,
qDB =
1
2
(a+ c  kB) >
1
2
(a+ c  kC) = q
D
C :
Condition (2) can be viewed as an upper limit for this type of subsidization. The following
proposition summarizes the welfare implications of non-exclusive trade.
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Proposition 4.3 Suppose there is an equilibrium where the optimal supply price policy is such
that both traders supply the commodity. One obtains the following welfare level:
F aggregate prot: D = D + DB + 
D
C
= 1
36b

4 (a  c  kB)
2 + 4 (a  c  kC)
2 + 7 (kB   kC)
2
;
F consumer surplus: SD = 1
72b
[(a  c  kB) + (a  c  kC)]
2
;
F welfare: WD = D + SD
= 1
72b

20 (a  c)2   20(kB + kC) (a  c)
+10
 
(kB)
2 + (kC)
2+ 13 (kB   kC)2 :
Welfare conditions are harder to interpret because there is a trade-off between more efcient
downstream trade and inefcient cost effects.
Proposition 4.4 Welfare e¤ects of non-exclusive trade
Non-exclusive trade will
(i) increase consumer surplus if
a  c > 2kC   kB;
(ii) increase aggregate prots if
16 (a  c  kC)
2 + 28 (kB   kC)
2
> 11 (a  c  kB)
2 ;
(iii) increase welfare if
136 (a  c)2 + 368 (a  c) kB + 320 (kC)
2 + 416 (kB   kC) > 640 (a  c) kC + 184 (kB)
2
:
The conditions on the exogenous parameters (a; c; kB; kC) that are listed in Proposition 4.4 are
necessary and sufcient conditions for welfare gains from non-exclusive trade. Most of these
conditions are not intuitive because they reect the trade-off between gains in consumer surplus
and the production inefciencies resulting from the inclusion of traders with higher costs. By
Proposition 4.2, gains in consumer surplus are achieved whenever there are non-exclusive trade
contracts. This is only the case if the high trading costs do not exceed the low costs by too
much, e.g., kB = kC . The greatest gain in consumer surplus is realized if kB = kC = 0.
Aggregate prots increase for kB = kC; which is obvious from Proposition 4.4 (ii). Hence, we
can conclude that non-exclusive trade is unambiguously welfare-enhancing if the local costs
of the traders are equal. Indeed, by continuity of the conditions in Proposition 4.4, this result
remains true for local costs that do not differ by too much.
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4.2 The n-trader case
Consider a set of n potential downstream traders who differ in kj: Denoting X =
P
k2J
xk as the
aggregate downstream supply and X j :=
P
j 6=k2J
xk as the aggregate supply of the competing
traders other than j; one can write the prot of Trader j as j = P (X j+xj) xj (qj + kj) xj .
Straightforward optimization with respect to the quantity xj yields rj(X j) = max
n
0;
a bX j qj kj
2b
o
:
Lemma 4.5 Given an array of prices q = (q1; :::; qn) charged by the producer, the Cournot
equilibrium with n potential traders is
F aggregate supply: XC(q) = 1
(n+1)b
 
na 
nP
j=1
(qj + kj)
!
;
F market price: pC(q) = 1
(n+1)

a+
nP
k=1
(qk + kk)

;
F supply of Trader j 2 J: xCj (q) = max
8><
>:0; 1(n+1)b
0B@a+ nP
k=1
k 6=j
(qk + kk)  n(qj + kj)
1CA
9>=
>; ;
F prot of Trader j 2 J: Cj (q) =
1
(n+1)2b
0B@a+ nP
k=1
k 6=j
(qk + kk)  n(qj + kj)
1CA
2
:
The producer chooses prices (qj)j2J to maximize
(q) :=
nX
j=1
(qj   c) x
C
j (q) =
1
(n+ 1)b
nX
j=1
(qj   c)
0BB@a+ nX
k=1
k 6=j
(qk + kk)  n(qj + kj)
1CCA :
Proposition 4.6 shows the solution to this problem.
Proposition 4.6 For a set of n potential traders, we obtain in equilibrium:
F traders' supply prices: qCj =
1
2
(a+ c  kj) ;
F downstream quantities: xCj = max

0; 1
2(n+1)b

a  c+
nP
k=1
kk   (n+ 1) kj

;
F aggregate supply: XC = 1
2(n+1)b

n (a  c) 
nP
k=1
kk

;
F downstream price: pC = 1
2(n+1)

(n+ 2)a+ nc+
nP
k=1
kk

;
F traders' prot: Cj =
1
4(n+1)2b

a  c+
nP
k=1
kk   (n+ 1) kj
2
;
F producer's prot: C = 1
4(n+1)b
"
nP
j=1
(a  c  kj)
2 + n
nP
k=1
k2k  

nP
k=1
kk
2#
:
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The optimal supply prices are the same as under the respective monopolies.5 The number of
active traders in a Nash equilibrium depends on the supply price vector q = (q1; :::; qn): Suppose
that there is a trader m  n who does not offer the producer's product given the equilibrium
supply prices. By Assumption 2.1(a), traders m + i for i = 1; ::; n   m also do not trade the
product. The following proposition gives the condition for traders to be active in the downstream
market.
Proposition 4.7 There exists a traderm 2 I such that all traders j < m supply and all traders
j  m do not supply. Traderm is determined by
km+1 > km 
1
n+ 1
 
a  c+
nX
k=1
kk
!
> km 1:
Proposition 4.7 is the analogue of Proposition 4.2 for the n-trader case. With differing trad-
ing costs, not all traders are necessarily active at the Nash equilibrium supply prices qC =
(qC1 ; :::; q
C
n ). However, given Assumption 2.1 (b), it is possible that all n traders are active,
kj <
1
n+1

a  c+
nP
k=1
kk

for all j 2 J . It is also possible to provide sufcient conditions
for the welfare effects of an increase in the number of active traders in the downstream market.
Consumer surplus is strictly increasing in the amount of the product traded downstream. By
setting XCn+1  X
C
n , we derive sufcient conditions under which the aggregate quantity traded
XC increases if the number of active traders increases:
a  c  (n+ 1) kn+1  
nX
j=1
kj:
From XC (Proposition 4.6), it is clear that this depends on whether the demand effect (a   c)
of an additional trader outweighs the additional costs kn+1 introduced by this trader. A more
clear-cut result is possible for symmetric local costs.
4.2.1 Symmetric local costs
Let kj = k for all j 2 J: By Proposition 4.7, it is optimal for the producer to have all n traders
active. In this special case, we can consider the limit if the number of traders increases.
5 This is a useful property of the linear demand function in combination with linear cost functions, which makes
the explicit derivation of a solution possible.
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Proposition 4.8 Assume kj = k for all j = 1; 2; :::; n: As n!1; we obtain in equilibrium:
F traders' supply prices: qCj =
1
2
(a+ c  k) ;
F downstream quantities: lim
n!1
xCj (n) = lim
n!1
max
n
0; 1
2(n+1)b
(a  c  k)
o
= 0;
F aggregate supply: lim
n!1
XC(n) = lim
n!1
n
2(n+1)b
(a  c  k) = 1
2b
(a  c  k) ;
F downstream price: lim
n!1
pC(n) = lim
n!1
n
2(n+1)

(n+2)
n
a+ c+ k

= 1
2
(a+ c+ k) ;
F traders' prot: lim
n!1
Cj (n) = lim
n!1
1
4(n+1)2b
(a  c  k)2 = 0;
F producer's prot: lim
n!1
C(n) = lim
n!1
n
4(n+1)b
(a  c  k)2 = 1
4b
(a  c  k)2 :
An individual trader's supply vanishes in the limit, traders' prot is driven to zero, and the pro-
ducer extracts the full monopoly rent. This result appears to be the scenario that most of authors
who were cited in the introduction have in mind. In the symmetric case, each additional trader
increases the aggregate downstream supply and social surplus. The limiting maximal aggregate
supply corresponds to the case in which the producer acts as a direct downstream monopoly.
This maximal supply denes the upper limit of social surplus. In conclusion, for symmetric
local costs, each additional trader reduces the double marginalization problem unambiguously
and leads to a higher prot for the monopolist and a higher consumer surplus.
5 Conclusion
We study Cournot quantity setting competition among traders of a homogeneous product in
the downstream market of a single producer. Without detailed analysis, the literature seems to
assume that, in the absence of vertical restraints, downstream competition is always benecial
to an upstream monopolist because it counterbalances the double marginalization problem he
would otherwise face. Our analysis conrms this intuition for a large number of downstream
traders with identical local costs. If downstream traders have differing local costs, such a result
does not hold true in general. It is in this respect that we believe our analysis is different from
existing works, such as those of REY AND VERGÉ (2008) and SAGGI AND VETTAS (2002).
In addition, we investigate the welfare effects of non-exclusive trade. We nd that the upstream
monopolist differentiates supply prices to keep as many traders as feasible in the downstream
market. This may, however, reduce consumer surplus compared to exclusive downstream trade.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We consider M under a monopoly of low-cost Trader B because
this yields higher prots for the producer than a monopoly of C:
D   M =
1
12b

(a  c  kB)
2 + (a  c  kC)
2 + (kB   kC)
2  1
8b
(a  c  kB)
2
=
1
24b
(a  c+ kB   2kC)
2  0:
By continuity of the producer's prot function, D = M when xDC = 0. For 
D = M ; B is a
downstream monopolist,
xDC = maxf0;
1
6b
(a  c+ kB   2kC)g = 0;
if and only if a   c + kB   2kC  0. There is non-exclusive downstream trade if and only if
(a  c  kC) > (kC   kB) :
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
(i): Consumer surplus
SD =
1
72b
[(a  c  kB) + (a  c  kC)]
2
>
1
32b
(a  c  kB)
2 = SM () a  c > 2kC   kB:
(ii): Aggregate prots
D = D + DB + 
D
C
=
1
36b

4 (a  c  kB)
2 + 4 (a  c  kC)
2 + 7 (kB   kC)
2
>
3
16b
(a  c  kB)
2 = M
() 16 (a  c  kC)
2 + 28 (kB   kC)
2
> 11 (a  c  kB)
2
:
(iii): Welfare
WD =
1
72b

20 (a  c)2   20(kB + kC) (a  c) + 10
 
(kB)
2 + (kC)
2+ 13 (kB   kC)
>
7
32b
(a  c  kB)
2 = WM
() 136 (a  c)2 + 368 (a  c) kB + 320 (kC)
2 + 416 (kB   kC) > 640 (a  c) kC + 184 (kB)
2
:
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